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It appeared that the land on which the Catholic church and parsonage in Portsmouth stands, was vested in the defendant, Bacon, bishop of the diocese, no trust
being eclared in writing: Held, that no special trust could be proved by parol.
-It appearing that the funds with which said land was bought and buildings
erected had been furnished for that purpose by subscriptions and contributions made
to the priest in charge for the time being, under the law, usage and polity of the
Roman Catholic church, by Catholics and others resident in Portsmouth and elsewhere: Ifeld, that no trust resulted to the society or congregation worshipping in
said church.
field, that the plaintiffs could not maintain their bill by virtue of the General
Statutes, ch. 139, sect. 5, because, assuming that the said congregation or society
could, under said statutes, be considered al having corporate powers, these plaintiffs could not maintain their bill for the protection of the quasi corporate rights,
because it did not appear that they had any authority, and that they could not
maintain the bill for the protection of their own inuterest in the quasi corporate property without alleging that the society was fraudulently neglecting to protect its
own rights, and making the society a party defendant.
The defendants having stated in their answer tlat by the law, usage and polity
of the Roman Catholic church, the title to all lands used for religious purposes,
churches, &c., is vqted in the bishop of the diocese in which the same are situated
for the use and benefit of the universal Catholic church, and that all gifts and contributions for such purposes are understood to be made under that rule, and that
these gifts and contributions were made under that rule, and it having been found
by the court that the legal title to the property was vested in the defendant, the
bishop, without any written declaration of trust, and that he was accountable only
to his ecclesiastical superiors, ZTeld, that the said defendant was not accountable in
this suit for his management of the property; and it appearing that the defendant
Walsh, had acted under the bishop's direction, Held, that he was not accountable
in this suit. field, that this court had no authority to take this property from the
bishop and place it in the hands of a new trustee.

BILL in equity.
This cause having been tried by the Circuit Court, before RAND,
J., it was agreed that it should be transferred upon the bill and
answers and the material facts found, by the court. The facts
found are as follows:
On the 15th day of June 1852, Charles McCallion, a Catholic
priest, was stationed at Portsmouth, by the appointment of J. B.
Fitzpatrick, Bishop of Boston, within whose diocese was the city
of Portsmouth and vicinity. There was at that time, and ever
since has been, at Portsmouth and in the vicinity a congregation
of Roman Catholics, who have worshipped at Portsmouth under
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the ministrations of said McCallion and .his successors.

They

have never had any corporate organization under the laws of this
state. McOallion undertook to build a church for the ise of the
Catholics of Portsmouth and its vicinity; and on the said 15th
day of June 1852, purchased a lot of land for that purpose of
George M. Marsh, for $1500. le paid $200 in cash, and gave a
mortgage for the balance of.the purchase-money. McCallion then
took subscriptions and contributions from his congregation and
others, and erected a wooden church upon the land, which was
used by him and his successors as a Roman Catholic church till it
was burned in November 1871. McCallion was named as defendant in the bill, but the bill was not served on him, and he did not
appear.
The mortgage remaining unpaid, it was, on the 8th day of June
1857, assigned to. D. W. Bacon, Bishop of Portland, and one of
the defendants, to whose diocese Portsmouth and the vicinity had
been in the meantime transferred. The assignment was recorded
in the records of Rockingham county, on the 13th lay of June
1857, and Bishop Bacon has ever since continued to hold the
mortgage.
On the 22d day of November 1853, one Owen Martin, having
recovered judgment against McCallion, levied his execution on
McCallion's equity of redemption in the premises, and the same
was conveyed by sheriffs deed to Martin for $162.62 ;"and he afterwards, on the 14th of May 1855, conveyed the same for $238, to
Bishop Fitzpatrick, within whose diocese Portsmouth then was.
By the usages of the Roman Catholic church in New England,
all church structures are held in the name of the bishop for the
use of the congregations who respectively attend public worship
therein. The legal title is vested in the bishop. No trust was
expressed in any of the conveyances above referred to; but the
money was furnished by the people, not by the bishop. The bishop
appoints the priests to the several parishes in his diocese and
removes them at his pleasure. Any misconduct of the priest is
corrected by complaint to the bishop, who is himself answerable
to his ecclesiastical superiors.
Soon after the erection of the church above named, McCallion
was summoned to another diocese, and Patrick Conovan, D. W.
Murphy, and the defendant T. C. Walsh, were successively appointed by Bishnp Bacon to the office of parish priest at PortsVOL. XXIV.-34
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mouth. They successively occupied the church under Bishop
Bacon up to the time of the filing of the plaintiff's bill They also
repaired and enlarged the church building from time to time, and
procured insurance upon it in the name of Bishop Bacon. And
for these purposes they used money obtained in the church by
contributions for the support of the church and its services, pewrent, special subscriptions, and sometimes their own private funds.
Most of the plaintiffs, if not all, contributed to these objects; some
of them quite largely. But what precise sums were contributed by
each, and for what particular object these sums were expended, did
-not appear. All these sums were collected by the priests, and it
did not appear that any account was ever rendered to the congregation. But the sums were contributed to provide a regular Catholic service in Portsmouth, and upon promises by the several
priests that such a service should be secured to the people.
The defendant Walsh was stationed at Portsmouth on the 11th
of June 1869. In September 1869, he procured insurance on the
church in the sum of $9000, in the name of Bishop Bacon,
paying the premiums partly by money collected in the usual manner,
and partly with his own money. The church was burned in
November 1871, and the insurance was collected to the amount of
$8400 by Bishop Bacon or in his behalf.
Soon afterwards the defendant Walsh undertoQk to build a new
church upon the same site, and set about getting subscriptions for
that purpose. He also called a meeting of the members of his
congregation, at which time a committee was chosen to assist in
the undertaking, and also a treasurer was chosen. Three persons
were nominated by the defendant Walsh, and approved by the
vote of those present. Differences soon arose between the committee and the treasurer on the one part, and the defendant Walsh
on the other. These differences grew out of the opposing claims
of the two parties as to the control of the funds to be collected, and
as to the plan of the church to be built. The defendant Walsh
claimed substantially that he should handle the funds, and dictate
as to the kind of church to be built; and be procured plans to be
made without consulting the committee and treasurer. Upon the
happening of the differences above mentioned, the committee and
treasurer resigned, and the defendant Walsh proceeded to collect
money and build a church according to his own views. Only ten
dollars were paid into the hands of the treasurer, and that sum
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was paid by Walsh, and soon afterwards paid back by the treasurer
to Walsh. The church, erected upon the site of the old church,
was a large brick church, costing about $40,000, about $16,000
of which remain unpaid at the present time. Large contributions
were made to build this church, both by the Catholics of Portsmouth
and by others not connected with the Roman Catholic church.
The defendant Walsh gave one thousand dollars. The church
erected has been and is now used for public worship according to
the forms of the Roman Catholic church, the defendant Walsh
officiating as priest. On Sundays the usual services of that church
have been holden by the defendant Walsh at 8 o'clock in the
forenoon, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, at which all persons
are admitted who choose to attend. At the 10 o'clock Sunday
morning service an admission fee of 25 cents has been demanded
by the sexton, acting under the direction of Mr Walsh, of all
persons except the poor, pew-holders, and those who have contributed towards the erection of the church. Pews are also rented to
individuals by the priest in the ordinary manner, and he takes the
rents for the support of the services of the church. There was
considerable controversy about the propriety of the 25-cent admission fee ; and some persons, who attempted to enter the church
without pa'ing the fee, have been excluded by the sextons, acting
under the direction of the priest, who claimed the fee in order to
help pay the debt of the church. There was evidence tending to
show that it was against the rules established by the Council of
Baltimore that any one should be stopped at the door of the church
to pay a fee. There was also evidence tending to show that the
rules of the Council did not forbid the collection of money at the
door of the church to pay the debts of the church. The rules of
the Council of Baltimore may be referred to in the argument of
this case, and are made part of the case.
The Roman Catholics in Portsmouth and vicinity, whose usual
place of worship is this church, number about 1500 or 2000.
In regard to the admis ;on fee of 25 cents, it was proved that a
similar fee has been demanded at some other Catholic churches in
New England.
One of the plaintiffs, John Conlon, moved to withdraw from the
suit, and another, John E. Hennessey, is a minor.
The plaintiffs are all members of the Catholic church in Ports-
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mouth, except perhaps Michael Cunningham, who has been excom.
municated for assault upon the priest.
The bill states that McCallion held the church and parsonage
in trust for the purpose of a place of public worship for all the
Catholic residents of Portsmouth and vicinity, and for all persons
desirous of attending services in the Catholic form to attend the
public worship therein to be had according to the Catholic religion
and for the conversion of the people to that faith, and that said
church was to be a free church where all people desirous of doing
so might attend public worship without price. It also states that
all the funds contributed afterward to McCallion and his successors,
for repairing, enlarging and insuring the church, were contributed
for the same trust; that McCallion had abandoned the trust; that
the defendant, Bacon, had received the insurance-money, and that
the defendant, Walsh, under Bacon's direction, had rebuilt the
church, assuming the whole control, and excluding the members
of the society from any voice or part in the matter; that he had
excluded from the services of the church those who had not in
some way contributed, unless they paid an admission fee.
The bill further charged that the defendant, Walsh, had been
guilty of using harsh and indecent language, comminations and
threats against those members who would not contribute.
The prayer of the bill is as follows:
"Wherefore, the plaintiffs pray that the said Walsh and the
said bishop, having assumed the place of trustees illegally and
wrongfully, they and their successors and assigns be ordered and
decreed to account for the disposition of the said insurance-money
and the said trust fund which have come into their hands from the
plaintiffs and all other persons, so the plaintiffs and all the subscribers to said fund may know where and how their trust fund is
invested, and where to find it hereafter in case of renewed trouble
or perversion thereof, so the same may not all be squandered and
lost, and that the said defendants Walsh and the bishop, and their
successors be ordered and decreed to.keep said church and land,
and the avails thereof for the purposes of said trust, and for such
trustee as this court shall appoint, and for public worship of God
in said Portsmouth and vicinity, according to the Catholic faith,
free to all whenever services are held therein, whoever pays for
such services.
"1Thata new trustee be appointed by the decree of this court to
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take charge of said trust fund; and to see that said trust is enforced.
"That said Walsh and said bishop, and their successors in the
priestly office over said church, be ordered and decreed to permit
any person to attend the public worship of God, whenever religious
services are held in said church, and to occupy such seats as are
not sold or let, or to occupy the aisles as they choose, and not to
charge any price of admission to such public religious services so
long as a single subscriber to said trust fund, who has subscribed
for the purpose aforesaid objects, and to order and decree otherwise in reference to the premises as may be just and right to protect all parties.
"And whereas, the plaintiffs cannot now attend said church
without strife and contention, and without being ejected therefrom,
may it please your honors to grant to the plaintiffs a writ of injunction to be directed to the said Walsh and the said Bacon, and
their successors in the priestly office aforesaid, and their aiders,
servants and abettors, strictly enjoining them from preventing the
plaintiffs and their families, and all persons desirous of attending
the public worship of God according to the Catholic faith, when
held in said church, from attending said services freely and without money or price, and enjoining them from debasing the altar
of said church from the worship of God to a place where a price
of admission is charged, and curses, disease and death are asked
for to fall upon members of the church and people, who in worldly
matters decline to follow just as the priest and bishop direct, and
for such other relief as may be just."
The answers substantially stated that by the law, usage and
polity of the Roman Catholic church, the title of lands used for
religious purposes, churches, &c., is vested in the bishop of the
diocese for the use of the universal Catholic church, and all gifts
and contributions for such purposes are understood to be made
under that rule; that the purchase-money of the land on which the
church and parsonage were erected were given under that rule,
and also all the money that had afterward been contributed towards
repairing, enlarging, insuring and rebuilding; that the defendant,
Walsh, was accountable only to the defendant, Bacon, and the
defendant, Bacon, only to his ecclesiastical superiors; that they
had full authority to rebuild as had been done,- and were accountable to no person but their ecclesiastical superiors. They denied
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that -there was any trust for the purpose of a free church, and said
that the public worship could not be supported on that plan. The
answer denied all improper conduct on the part of the defendant,
Walsh, but also said that the matters complained of were matters
wholly of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The bill and the answer are
much abridged in the foregoing statement, which, however, contains in connection with the .statement of facts found by the court
all that is necessary for the understanding of the questions raised
and decided.
Goodall and Marston, for plaintiffs.
Hatch and Fink, for defendants.
CUSHING, C. J.-It appears, from the facts reported in the
case, that the society or congregation usually worshipping in the
Catholic church in Portsmouth numbers from 1500 to 2000, of
whom the seventeen plaintiffs appear to be the only persons dissatisfied with the management of the property. They do not complain of the dedication of this church property to the pious uses
of the Catholic religion, but appear to claim that the society ought
not to be excluded from the management and control of the pro-

perty.
It is somewhat difficult to ascertain from the bill and the case
on exactly what ground the plaintiffs desire to stand. Conceding,
as they do, that this property has been given by themselves and
by others to somebody for some purposes, they of course have no
private rights of property. They do not profess to sue as well for
the other members of the society as for themselves, so that they
do not appear to represent, or claim to represent the society, collectively.
If I understand the views of plaintiffs' counsel they are these:
They say that this property was given to McCallion in the first
instance under such circumstances that a trust resulted to the

society or congregation of Catholics in and around Portsmouth, and
that by our law (Gen. Stat., ch. 189, sect. 5), this fund or pro-

perty having been given to that society, the society is by virtue
of the statute endowed with corporate powers for the purpose of
protecting and managing the fund and property. I say resulting
trust, because it is found by the court that the legal title to this
property is vested in the bishop, but that no trust was declared in
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any of the conveyances of the property. No question appears to
have been made in regard to the legal effect of the conveyance to
McCallion, the-mortgage by him, the levy on the equity of redemption for McCallion's debt by Owen Martin, the purchase of that
equity by Bishop Fitzpatrick, and the purchase of the mortgage by
the defendant, Bacon. It is found among the facts by the court
that the legal title was in the bishop, now deceased, and that in
the conveyances by which he obtained the title there was no declaration of trust. This is a statement of the general rule of the
Catholic church, and also intended to apply to this partieular case.
In factl it appears that no other result could be produced by the
conveyances found in the case.
I understand, therefore, the position of the plaintiff to be, that
the legal title being first in McCallion and then in the bishop, the
real ownership of the property was in the society.
Sec. 5, ch. 139, General Statutes, is as follows: 1 If any donation, gift or grant be made to any unincorporated religious society,
such society shall have the like power to manage, use and employ
the same accordhig to the terms and conditions on which the same
may be made, as incorporated societies may have by law-to
elect suitable trustees, agents or officers therefor, and to prosecute
and sue for any right which may vest in them in consequence of
such donation, gift or grant; and such society shall be a corporation so far as may be necessary for the purposes expressed in this
section ; but the income of the donations, gifts or grants to any
such unincorporated religious society shall not exceed the sum of
$5000 a year."
Under this statute it is claimed that the society or congregation
of Catholics is, for the purpose of managing this fund, a corporation, and entitled by its duly authorized agents and committees to
sue and maintain actions, and liable to be sued. But the plaintiffs have not made this society a party, neither do they show any
authority possessed by them to act for it.
It is true that there are cases in which some of the members of
the corporation may, on their own behalf and that of the other
members, maintain a bill in their private capacity where the corporation and its, officers are negligently or fraudulently permitting
its interest to be sacrificed.
Pear8onv. Tower, and Windsor v. Bailey, in this court (to be
reported in 55 N. I.), were both cases in which a part of the stock-
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holders suing the corporation and directors, were obliged to amend
to the effect that they were suing as well for all the other stockholders as for themselves, and in each of those cases the corporation itself was made a party : March v. Eastern Railroad,40 N. H.
548, and I think it would be so in this case. These plaintiffs, not
being authorized by the corporation to assert and protect its rights,
must make the quasi corporation a party, and must show in their
bill some neglect or fraudulent collusion on the part of the quasi
corporation, in order to entitle them to interfere and draw the
affairs and property of the quasi corporation into litigation.
The bill is, th9refore, on this theory bad, and cannot be maintained, for both these reasons.
The answers state that, "by the law, usage and policy of the
Roman Catholic church, the title to all lands used for religious
purposes, churches, &c., is vested in the bishop of the diocese in
which the same are situated, for the use and benefit of the universal
Catholic church; and all gifts and contributions for such purposes
are understood to be made under that rule."
The case finds that, "by the usages of the Roman Catholic
church in New England, all church structures are held in the name
of the bishop, for the use of the congregations who respectively
attend public worship therein. The legal title is vested in the
bishop. No trust was expressed in any of the conveyances above
referred to, but the money was furnished by the people, not by the
bishop. The bishop appoints the priests to the several parishes in
his diocese, and removes them at his pleasure. Any misconduct
of the priest is corrected by complaint to the bishop, who is himself answerable to his ecclesiastical superiors."
It is true that the court has found that, although the legal title
to, this church and church property v~as in the bishop, yet the
money was furnished by the people. There is an ambiguity in the
word "people," which might mean the whole society or congregation collectively, or it might mean the gifts of individuals, members
of the society. The bill and answer and report taken together,
show that the funds were the gifts and subscriptions and contributions of individuals, and not always of Roman Catholics. If any
trust then resulted, it would be to the individuals who contributed
the fund, and not to the society. Lord HIARDWICKE, as cited by
Kent, 4 Com. 306, said that a resulting trust, arising by operation
of law, existed, (1) when the estate was purchased in the name

HENNESSEY ,. WALSH.

of one person, and the cohsideration came from another; (2) when
a trust was declared only as to a part and nothing was said as to the
residue; that residue remaining undisposed of, remained to the
heir-at-law. He observed that he did not know of any other instances of a resulting trust, unless in cases of fraud.
Now, it is not claimed in this case that there hasbeen any fraud.
The property was conveyed to MeCallion just exactly as those who
gave the money intended it to be. There is no claim or pretence
that the funds which have been contributed have not been fairly
and honestly laid out in repairing, enlarging and insuring the original church, and in rebuilding the new one. And it is not denied
that a regular Catholic service has been secured to the society.
In the absence, then, of all pretence of fraud, the only trusts
which could reshlt would be those described above by Lord HARDWIcKE. There being no declaration of trust for any part of the
estate, it could not be the last of those mentioned, and it must,
therefore, be the first; so that the effect would be that this property
would be owned by the individuals who had contributed to the
fund, without any special trust at all, which is the exact contrary
to the trust claimed in the bill.
The court, however, finds that the legal title to the property is
vested in the bishop, and that by none of the conveyances have
any trusts in writing been declared. It is very well settled (Hall'
v. Congdon, in this court, to be reported in 55 N. H.) that under
such circumstances no parol evidence could be given to prove any
special trust; so that, independently of the statements in the answers, the property is vested in the bishop, free from all trusts.
whatever. It may have been prudent and wise, or it may not havebeen prudent and wise in those who gave the money, to intrust it
so absolutely to the bishop, without exacting from him a written
declaration of the trusts on which he was to hold it. They certainly had a right to do so, but they certainly have not done so.
The answers; however, show that this property is vested inthe
bishop for the use of the universal Catholic church; that the defendant, Walsh, and the other priests who, under the bishop's
direction, have controlled and managed this property, are responsible to the bishop only, and the bishop is responsible to his
ecclesiastical superiors.
No special trust having been declared in writing, and none being
capable of being proved by parol, it is a matter between the bishop
VOL. XXIV.-35
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and his own conscience whether he will appropriate this property
thus vested absolutely in him for the benefit of the Catholic church
according to its rules and regulations, or otherwise. So long as
he does not use the property so as to injure others, or violate the
laws, it is not easy to see how he is amenable to the laws.
It is blear that this court cannot in this suit take this property
from the hands of the bishop, and place it in the hands of a new
tiustee.
And so far as the bill claims an accounting from the defendants,
Walsh and Bacon, it clearly must fail. The money which has
been expended on this church property has been given absolutely
to the bishop, to be used by him and under his direction, without
accounting to anybody but his ecclesiastical superiors.
So in regard to the complaint that the defendant, Walsh, has
wrongfully excluded the plaintiffs from some of the religious services in the church. The court has not found that it is contrary
to the usages and rule of the Catholic church to exact, from those
who are able to pay, contributions according to their means for the
support of the institutions of religion according to the Catholic
faith. The case, therefore, does not call for an expression of the
'iews of the court on this point, but I am very strongly of the
opinion that this is entirely a matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction
with which this court has nothing to do.
The bill also contains formidable charges of indecent and abusive
speech on the part of the defendant, Walsh, in regard to some or
all of these plaintiffs.
It is enough, perhaps, to say here that the court has not found
the facts to be so. I do not understand that the bill charges any
expressions of a slanderous or defamatory character. The language stated in the bill consists rather of imprecations and comminations, doubtless calculated, if it had been used, to wound
deeply the sensibilities of the persons against whom it is alleged to
have been directed. It does not appear to me that such matters
are within the civil jurisdiction of the courts. They are rather
matters of ecclesiastical cognisance. It is quite likely that in many
religious denominations, Protestant as well as others, there may
be exercised a good deal of spiritual tyranny, and there may be,
and probably are, many persons who, from the effect, perhaps, of
early education and association, and the natural constitution of
their mental character, are unable to resist such influences. Civil
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courts can protect their rights of person and property, but cannot
liberate their souls. The court, however, has entirely negatived
all conduct of this kind complained of in the bill.
It will be observed that the whole question in this case is as to
the conflicting claims and rights of these plaintiffs on the one
hand, and of the society or congregation of Catholics in Portsmouth and their ecclesiastical directors and guides on the other.
Both parties claim under the same title, and that is the legal title
once vested in the defendant, Bacon, and now, we must suppose,
in his successor. It is true the counsel for the plaintiffs claims
that the mortgage from Mcallion to his vendor was void as not
having been sanctioned by the society, but most assuredly, putting
it in the strongest way for the plaintiffs, the society could not be
made a qua8i corporation until the gift which was to make them
so bad been completed, and the transaction of the deed to McCallion and the mortgage back must be considered as one.
As between these plaintiffs, then, on the one hand, and the defendants on the other, who I think must be considered as really
representing the society, it appears to me that the right i5 with the
defendants, and that the bill must be dismissed.
LADD, J.j concurred.
SMITH, J.-I am also of the opinion that this bill must be dismissed. The plaintiffs, seventeen in number, out of a society or
congregation of some fifteen hundred, bring this suit, not in behalf
of themselves and all others interested, for removing some grievance common to them all, but. to effect some change in the manner
in which this church property is held, not asked for or desired by
the great body of their 'associates. The title to this lot of land
and to the church structure thereon, is, upon its face, absolute in
the defendant, Bacon. If it is affected by any trust, it must
result by operation of law from the payment of the purchasemoney. The property was purchased from contributions and subscriptions of sundry individuals, Catholics and others, of Portsmouth and vicinity. By the usage and polity of the Roman
Catholic church, all church structures are held in the name of the
bishop. All who contributed to the purchase of this lot and
erection of the church edifice, did so, as the case finds, with
the understanding that the title would be vested in the bishop, to
be applied by him for the purposes of religious worship according
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to the Catholic faith. Having donated their money for this purpose, they cannot now impose new conditions as to the purposes
for or manner in which it shall be held. No trust can, therefore,
result to the plaintiffs.
The church structure erected with these funds, and so held by
the defendant, Bacon, has been held for the use of those who desired
to worship therein as Catholi'cs, and there is no allegation or proof
that he has attempted. or threatened to divert the property to any
other use.
The facts reported by the judge who tried the cause, fail to
sustain the plaintiffs' allegation of misconduct on the part of the
defendant, Walsh. He has charged an admission fee for attendance upon one of the three services held on the Sabbath, but the
poor, the pew-holders, and those who contributed towards the
erection of the church, are exempted from this charge. Such of
the plaintiffs as contributed would of course not be subjected to
such payment, and those of the plaintiffs who did not clearly have
no such interest in the title to these premises as will entitle them
to maintain this suit.
It does not appear to be contrary to the~rules and usages of
this denomination to require those who attend public worship to
contribute to the expense thereof. However desirable it may be
to furnish the opportunity for public religious worship "without
money and without price," it has seldom been proved practicable
to do so.
There is nothing in the provisions of ch. 139, General Statutes,
that prevents any other trustee or person than those named in sec.
5, to whom property has been donated in trust, from holding it
for the benefit of a religious corporation or society. No uniform
rule is attempted to be laid down to which every religious society,
whether incorporated or not, must conform. But rather provision
is made whereby defects in a church organization are supplied, so
that property donated for pious purposes may not fail of reaching
the objects intended by the donors..
Bill dismissed.
This case presents, in another form,
the same question we have repeatedly
liscussed in these pages-how far the
civil courts will attempt t6 control the
action of the ecclesiastical courts, or
officers, in regard to matters exclusively

of ecclesiastical cognisance.

We are
gratified to be able to offer the profession
the opinion of the highest judicial tribunal in one of the oldest of the American
states, upon a form of this question, in
regard to which there is, in the corn-
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innity, undoubtedly evidence of some
degree of over-watehf'ulness, possibly
or ovcr-seiisitiveiiess, quite out of proportion to its inherent importance or
danger, but upon which the opinion is as

an inquiry to what extent any cne can
expect to obtain redress for any ecclesiastical action which lie may regard as
irregular or oppressive, as well as subversive of his personal rights. And to
entirely exempt from all color of zeal or
this extent the cases all agree that it
prepossession as it is possible to con- must be the unlawfid infringement of
ceive. This is the more refreshing, as we some personal right, of pecuniary value,
have before had occasion to review the and of a character redressible in the
opinions of the highest judicial tribunals civil courts, in order to justify their
in some of the states, and even of the interference in matters professedly of
Supreme Court of the nation, where ecclesiastical cognisanec: Grimes v.
the controversies had their origin in
1arinan, 35 Ind. 198. And in deterthe ecclesiastical tribunals, which the mining this question of "unlawful incivil courts were asked to revise, and fringement," some principles are well
where it was impossible to account for settled by the repeated decisions of the
the diverse nature of the decisions upon courts, with slight or no conflict.
1. The decisions of ecclesiastical
any other rational basis of argument
or conjecture, except that of partizan courts, or officers, having, by the rules
prejudice and prepossession, however or laws of the bodies to which they
painful it may be to believe in the ex- belong, jurisdiction of such questions,
istence of such a sentiment in the or the right to decide them, will be held
conclusive in all courts of the civil
highest judicial tribunals of the country:
Gartin v. Pcanock-, ante, vol. 9, pp. administration, and no question involved
210-225 ; hI-atsou v. Jones, ante, 'vol. in such decisions will be revised or re11, pp. 430-457 ; s. c., 13 Wallace 679. viewed,in the civil courts, except those
We have also discussed, very much at pertaining to the jurisdiction of such
length, in thecases just cited, and in the courts or officers, to determine such
now celebrated Cheney case, arte, vol. questions according to the law or usage
10, pp. 295-313, the general question in- of the bodies which they represent.
volved in tile case now under considera- This is abundantly shown in the cases
tion. This question, briefly stated, is already cited, and most of the authorisimply, as before intimated, to what ex- ties are referred to in the pages before
tent the civil tribunals in the American cited, and need not le here repeated
states can lawfully interfere with what l3oubl V. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131.
is purely ecclesiastical administration.
2. It is a universal rule of law, apWe may state here that we use the plicable not only to this subject, but to
terms " ecclesiastical administration" all subjects connected with legal adto cover all that pertains, strictly and ministration, that one who becomes a
legally, to the. action of churches, member of any church, or other society,
whether it be in obedience to the deci- thereby consents to be governed by the
sions of church courts or the advice of
rules or laws of such organization, and
church councils, or, on the other hand, - that lie cannot justly claim to have
the personal action of executive officers suffered wrong or injury by the enforceof such churches, like trustees, pastors, went of such rules upon himself or his
priests, bishops or popes, single or com- property, upon the maxim, volenti non
bined. In all these cases the civil courts fit injuria. Ani this maxim applies to
must regard the action, and the right cases where the party voluntarily places
of contest in the same way. It is simply himself in a position ultimately to Ive
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an act done affecting his interests, or
done at the will of afiother, as if be
subjected himself directly and immediately to the act; upon the principle
that one who puts the slowest agencies
at work, which are sure in the end to
produce a given result, is as truly the
author of the ultimate result as if produced by ever so immediate and direct
causes. This is but an elemehtary
proposition, and needs no authority.
3. That the courts will not interfere
with the internal police and discipline
of churches or other voluntary societies,
so long as they keep within the reasonable application of their own rules,
which were known to the members, or
might have been learned by them, upon
reasonable inquiry, at the time of connecting themselves with the society or
church. In applying the proposition to
the Roman church, we must not he understood to imply that all possible applications of the rule in that direction
would be justified. If that church,
acting upon its recent assertiop of the
doctrine of infallibility, as implying not
mere finality (a form of infallibility
which "exists in all tribunals of last
resort, because there is no appeal),
but also perfect wisdom and truth;
if, we say, that church, acting upon
the modern definition of infallible wisdom in its head, the rope of Rome,
should attempt to revive in this country
some of its obsolete usages and discipline, like the Inquisition, and seriously set about instituting an auto de
fe in one of our towns or cities, upon
the ground that what was once recognised by infallible authority was meet
and fit for all times, we have no doubt
the civil authority would disperse the
procession as a mob and a nuisance, if,
indeed, that work were not anticipated
by the public expression of the popular
will in some less regular form. No
doubt the civil law will protect the members of that church from being burned at

the stake for heresy, and equally from
any corporeal infliction of discipline, by
way of penance or otherwise, notwithstanding any authority it might be able
to produce from its archives of decretals,
that such had been the general practice
of the church in former ages. We do
not mean to say that, if any member of
the Roman church should persist in remaining with them after full notice of
the revival of the ancient discipline of
corporeal chastisement by way of penance, that the civil courts could relieve
him from submitting to the established
discipline of his church, after fair notice of what it was to be. But if the
revival was sprung upon him unawares,
he certainly would have the right to
retire, and if the church refused to let
him and inflicted stripes against his will,
it would be open to action for the assault
and battery. All that we intend to imply
by our proposition upon this subject is,
that the members of that church, in
continuing to act with it and to support
its worship, by giving money to build
churches and to maintain public worship, must be considered as assenting to
such donations being used in the same
manner constantly practised by the
officers of the church in this age and
country. And that is all that is required to sustain the decision of the
court in the principal case. This is the
same rule we apply to all churches, and,
indeed, to all voluntary societies.
Money given absolutely and unconditionally to build churches, in any church
or society, is not affected with any implied trust except that it shall be applied to the purposes for which it was
given, according to the laws and usages
of that particular church or society.
There is no pretence of any resulting
trust to the donor in such cases. That
only exists where the purchase-money
is paid by one, and the title taken in
the name of another, for the sole benefit
of him who paid the price: Finch v.
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Finch, 15 Ves. 48.50; Lewin 133, and
cases cited. This case presents not the
remotest analogy to resulting trust.
If that werc so, the persons giving
money, absolutely and unconditionally,
to build churches, or schools, or hospitals, or for any other charitable purpose, would really own, in fee simple,
t.he entire institutions thus dedicated to
charity, an absurdity which needs only
to he stated to be rejected by all, for
there can be no such thing as a resulting trust of this special character
attempted to be maintained in the principal case. Resulting trusts are always
and only of the entire title in the subject of the trust, and only to the donor
or donors, or, more properly, the
owners. For, in the case of a requlting
trust, there is 'no gift and no purpose
of charity, or public benefit of any
kind, l1u; simply and only of purchase,
and private and exclusive ownership,
which i- as remote as possible from
every feature of the present case.
The present case seems to us, judging
from the provisions and especially the
prayers of the bill, to have originated
in a misconception of the powers and
duties of courts of equity, not very uncommon, even among tolerably well
instructed members of the profession,
viz., that it is competent, by means of
injunctions, or, at all events, by resort
to a receivership, to operate a railway or
a church, or almost any other organization, under the direction of the court,
foran indefinite period. We knowthat
this has sometimes been attempted in
our country, and there are melancholy
instances of operating railvays for the
period of a generation, possibly, in
some portions of the country, by means
of receiverships in chancery. But nothing of that kind is ever attempted in
England, or coul ever be accomplished
there. And it is done here only by an
entire perversion of the powers of a
court of equity, or else by a culpable
neglect to terminate a temporary expedi-

ent in the shortest possible time. The
party aggrieved can only seek redress,
ordinarily, from the power of the corporation or organization to which lie
has committed himself andhis interests,
and failing in that, lie must be content
to bear his burdens, and all the civil
courts can properly do in such cases is
to guaranty the members of churches
and other organizations of which they
are voluntary members a free departure,
and that they shall not suffer any
forcible infliction at the hands of the
officers of such 'churches or societies,
being themselves ready and willing to
depart in peace. This is abundantly
shown in repeated decisions in the
English courts of equity, as well in
the court of last resort as in all the
subordinate tribunals: Orr v. Glasgow
Railway, 3 Macqueen Ho. Lds. 799;
s. c., 6 Jur. N. S. 877 ; Brown r. loniaouth Railway, 13 Beav. 32. In the
case of Adley v. The IVhitstable Co.,
17 Ves. 315, 323, the Chancellor, Lord
ELDON, examined this question very

carefully, and came to the conclusion
that, in some few extreme cases, it
might become indispensable for courts
of equity to assume the control of railways, and other corporate organizations,
for limited periods, by way of receiverships, in order to enforce liens or judgments, but none of the instances adduced bear the remotest analogy to the
case under review. The subject is
extensively examined in Davis v. Gray,
16 Wallace 203 ; see also Ellis v. B.,
H. 6- C. Railway, 107 Mass. 1. The
cases are numerous and all in one
direction, showing that courts of equity
will not attempt to direct the internal
management of corporations, even of a
commercial and business character, except in very extreme cases. And it requires no argument to show the unreasonableness, and even absurdity, of
asking a court of equity to assume the
administration of the parochial department of the Roman church in this
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country, an organization as capable of
administering its own offices as almost

comprehended by them, lint which, in
fiact, would have jiistiiicd the inier-

any other in the country, and whose
rules and discipline are as clearly defined, and uniformly administered, in
all places, as any other, and in regard
to which no member could ever fairly
complain of surprise, after having been
reared within its limits, as the petitioners here seem to have been.
The truth unquestionably is, that the
order and discipline of this ancient
church is somewhat at variance with the
free spirit of the age and country, and
with the rationalistic tendencies of our
Protestant faith ; and this contrast between that stable church and the restless
activity of the age and country, is tending more and more, every year, to unsettle the quiet contentment of spirit of
the more enterprising members of that
-venerable communion, thus begetting a
desire in the more unquiet to grasp the
reins away from the established hierarchy
and drive the chariot in their own way
and manner, not doubting, probably, to

ference of'the court, in the ease unider

be able to effect vast improvements,
much as Phaeton attempted to drive the
chariot of the Sun, to his own discomfiture and the horror of the dwellers
below. This restlessness of spirit which
pervades all minds, more or less, in our
widely-extended country, is nowhere
more ardent or sincere than in the
general desire among some of the
Protestant sects to reform the Roman
church. This is a very natural and,
within proper limits, a commendable
sentiment, to extend our own light and
liberty to others. But the attempt to
compass the result by appeals to the
civil courts, is one that can never receive the countenance of any wise and
prudent friend of constitutional government. It has already received more
countenance in our country than is entirely creditable to our courts. Thus,
in O'Hear v. De Goesbriand, 33 Vt.
593, the court adopted a principle thq
full extent of which was not probably

review, to the full extent it is invoked
in the bill. The court, in the last case
cited, utterly ignore the cardinal principle of all voluntary societies, that the
members, in becoming and continuing
such, voluntarily consent to hold all
their rights and privileges subject to
the rules 'of the organizatioi, one of

which in the Roman church is, that the
priests and bishops exercise a perfectly
despotic authority in modelling and remodelling the places of public worship
at will ; and any one who purchased a
sitting, in a particular place in any
Roman church edifice, must be regarded
as virtually consenting .to the rightful
authority of the bishop to modify or
remove such sittings at pleasure. This
consideration, which was decisivc of
the Vermont case, and of all cases
coming w ithin its operation, seems to
have been wholly overlooked or ignored
by the Vermont court. A very similar
spirit seems to pervade the decisions in
some other cases where tie interests of
the Roman church have come in controversy: Minor v. The Board of Edication, in Cincinnati, in the Superior
Court, reported in a separate volume.
We should be glad to believe that these
decisions were wholly above the influ.
ence of partisan prejudice, as much as
we feel the decision under review to be,
or as that of the Board of Education v.
Minor, 23 Ohio, N. S., 211-254, uudoubtedly was, where the decision below
was reversed upon the clearest grounds.
But there are few educated minds wholly

incapable of wresting argument and
reason toward the accomplishment of
some great good, even in the seat of
We almost
judicial administration.
unconsciously bend the argumets and
reasons to meet our own desires.
And there are, no doubt, a very large
number of educated and well disposed
persons who convince themselves, with-
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out much careful study or reflection,
that the provisions in our American
Constitution, guarantying freedom of
religion to every member of the community, in some indefinable way or
manner, must secure every one from all
oppression or abuse in his own church
or comunion. But slight examination of these provisions will convince
all, that they were only intended to
secure persons freedom of selection in
regard to the church or society where
they will exercise religious privileges,
and to what extent they will cot:tribute
to its support. These provisions are all
much the same. For instance, in New
"Iamplmre, the state immediately in
question: "Every individual has a
natural anti inalienable right to worship
God according to the dictates of his own
conscience and reason, and no person
shall be hurt, molested or restrained in
his person, liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and reason
most agreeable to tile dictates of his
own conscience." In Massachusetts :
1 No subject siall be hurt, molested or
restrained in his person, liberty or estate, for worshipping God in the manner
most agreeable to his conscience."
New York : "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, -hmll forever be allowed in
this state to all mankind." Pennsylvania : "All men have a natural and
indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their
Ohio has it in
own consciences."
almost the precise words of Pennsylvania. In short, the substantial import
is the same in all the states. Itamounts
to a declaration against any established
church or state religion, and there is no
implication or hint that the legislatures
or time courts are to be charged with
any supervision of the ecclesiastical adminlistration in particular churches, in
order to secure thit libertyv of conscience. 'rhec cou.-titutional declaraVOL. XXIV.-M36

tions seem rather to prohibit than encourage any judicial interferences with
the internal economy of the churches,
since that could not be Inne without
abridging the liberty of the majority of
the members who did not complain.
That is sufficiently secured by the right
to elect and change one's own church
relations at will. And we trust the
time is fast coming in this country when
no one will attempt to invoke the aid
of the arm of the civil law, in any
form, either to promote or hinder any
religious denomination in the perfect
freedom of its action. We hail the
present decision as an advance, in very
temperate measure, in the right direction.
We have said nothing of one complaint in the bill, i. e., that of the priest
scolding or cursing the members for
assumed defection of duty, for there
was no proof upon this point. But if
there had been, it is nothing for which
the courts could give redress, unless it
amounted to slander. And to have that
effect, it must appear, not only that the
charges were false, but also malicious,
and that the priest used the shield of his
office for the mere purpose of wanton
defamation. And although it is very
common for all ministers, Protestant as
well as Roman, to admonish their hearers, in no very moderate terms, of their
shortcomings in duty, it is presumed few
cases will occur where it amounts to
slander, as defined above. itthe majority of cases, it will, no doubt, be
found tlat the reproof was founded in
truth and justice. We have not adverted
either to the fact that the New Ilampshire Constitution, in terms, requires
that "the governor, councillors, senators and representatives must be of the
Protestant religion," and that the courts
have construed this to be a "positive
test," and "not merely the negative
qualification of not being a Roman
Catholic :" Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9.
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We canfiot see that this had any particular bearing upon the question before
the court. It would rather lead us to expect hard measure for Roman Catholics
in that state, and may thus, in a measure,
explain why such a suit should have
been instituted, and why many persons
there seriously expected its success.
And it may rather tend to increase our
admiration of the better spirit prevailing in the courts of that state. The
court, in People v. St. George's Society,

28 Mich. 261, adopt the view of noninterference with tbe internal administration of voluntary societies, and, as

before suggested, we trust it is fast
becoming the general sentiment of the
country. All that our people require in
such matters is proper instruction and
to be fairly dealt with. The mass of
the people are always prompt to accept
the truth, if they only know what it is.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
JOHN II. WATSON v. BENJAMIN TRIPP, TREASURER OF THE CITY OF
PROVIDENCE.

Tax-payers are disqualified at common law for jurors in actions against the municipality.
The charter of a company operating cars drawn by horse power upon tracks
laid in the streets of a city provided that said corporation should keep in repair
such portions of the streets as should be occupied by their tracks, and should be
liable for any loss or injury that any person shall sustain by reason of any carelessness, neglect or misconduct of its agents and servants, in the management,
construction or use of said tracks or streets ; and in case any damage shall lie
recovered against said towns or the said city, by reason of any such misconduct,
defect or want of repairs, said corporation shall be liable to pay to such towns and
city respectively, any sum thus recovered against them, together with all costs and
reasonable expenditures incurred by them respectively, in the defence of any such
suit or suits in which recovery may be had; and said corporation shall not encumber any portion of the streets or highways not occupied by said tracks. In an
action against the city to recover damages for injuries caused by a defective highway, which was made unsafe by work done by the railroad company on its track:
Held, that the city was liable for neglecting to keep its streets safe and convenient
for public travel ; that the duty, resting upon a town or city, to keep its highways
safe and convenient, is a public duty, and that it has no power, unless authorized
by statute, to divest itself, either by contract or ordinance, of its capacity to discharge this duty.
Senible, that the liability of the railroad company, as above stated, is a matter
which may be considered by the jury in determining whether or not the city has
been guilty of any culpable neglect or want of reasonable care.

Tuis was a motion for the new trial of an uction in which the
plaintiff recovered a verdict for damages against the city of Providence, for the alleged heglect of the city to keep one of its streets
safe for public travel.
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Francis W. Miner, for plaintiff.
Charles 1T Parkhurst,for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
0. J.-The first ground assigned for a new trial is the
exclusion of certain jurors from sitting as such in the trial of the
case, because they were tax-payers in the city. The defendant
admits that at common law such an interest would disqualify a
juror, but claims that the common law has been changed by statute:
Gen. Stat R. I., c. 189, §§ I and 2 The first of the two sections
referred to declares who shall be liable to serve as jurors; the
second, who shall be exempt from service. The tpvo sections are
obviously designed to define the liability to jury service as a general duty, and not with reference to specific cases. The provisions
have long existed without change, except in the list of exemptions.*
The practice has always been to inquire of the jury, when empannelled, if any one of them has formed or expressed an opinion,
or is related to either of the parties, or is interested in the event
of the suit; and to excuse any juror who answers either of the
questions in the affirmative. If the defendant's view is correct, the
practice is erroneous. We think the defendant's view is not correct.
A person may be liable to jury service under the statute, and yet
be disqualified from service in a particular case by reason of
interest, relationship, or the bias of an opinion already formed or
expressed. The very jurors who were excused from service in this
case, because they were interested as tax-payers in its decision,
were nevertheless liable to service in other cases, and doubtless
performed it. The first ground assigned for a new trial cannot be
sustained.
The second ground is a ruling in regard to the liability of the
city of Providence. It appeared in evidence that the defect in the
street which was complained of by the plaintiff was caused by
work doing upon a railway track laid in the street by.the Union
Railroad Company. The charter of the company contains the
following provision
"Said corporation shall put all streets and highways, and every
portion thereof, over or through which they shall lay any rails, in
as good condition as they were before the same were laid; and they
shall keep and maintain in repair such portions of the streets and
DURFEE,
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highways as shall be occupied by their tracks, and shall beiliable
for any loss or injury that any person shall sustain by reason ot
any carelessness, neglect, or misconduct of its agents and servants,
in the management, construction or use of said tracks or streets,
and in case any damage shall be recovered against said towns or
the said city, by rbason of any such misconduct, defect, or want
of repairs, said corporation shall be liable to pay to such towns
and city respectively, any sums thus recovered against them,
together with all costs and reasonable expenditures incurred by
them respectively, in the defence of any such suit or suits, in
which recovery may be had; and said corporation shall not
encumber any portion of the streets or highways not occupied by
said tracks." •
The counsel for the defendant claims that the effect of this provision is not only to charge the company with the duty of keeping
in repair such portions of a street as they occupy, but also to discharge the city, and, on the trial, he requested the court so to rule.
The court refused to comply with this request. This refusal is
assigned as a second ground for a new trial.
The provision contains within itself convincing evidence that
the construction contended for was not contemplated by the legis
lature. It provides that in'
case any damage is recovered of the
city for any such defect or want of repair, the company shall be
liable to reimburse it. If, however, the city were relieved from
the duty of repairing, no judgment could be recovered against it
for not repairing. The counsel suggests that, though the city is
relieved, it is not so absolutely relieved but that it may be liable
where the company is guilty of a persistent neglect which is
brought to the notice of the city, and that the remedy over is given
in view of a case of that kind. If this be so, it does not follow
that the court has erred; for the court was requested to rule thas
the liability of the city was not simply qualified, but discharged.
The suggestion is, however, in our opinion, inadmissible, except
perhaps to this extent: that the liability of the company is a
matter which may be considered by the jury in determining whether
or not the city has been guilty of any culpable neglect or want of
reasonable care. We think the provision charges the company
with a duty which, if duly performed, so far relieves the city, and
with a responsibility 'which, if the duty is neglected, secures the
city against damages, but at the same time leaves the liability of
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the city towards the public without qualification, except as above
indicated. The duty of keeping a street safe and convenicit is
not so exclusive that it may not be obligatory on both the city and
the company. Instances often occur in which such a duty is
common to a city or town, and an individual or corporation. Thus
a man may lawfully deposit his wood or coal upon a sidewalk for
a short time while in transit to its place of storage. But he must
remove it, and, if he neglects, the city must remove it, without
ufireasonable delay. If the removal is neglected, and any person
is injured in consequence, such person may sue either the city or
the individual; and the city, if sued, cannot excuse itself upon the
ground that it was the duty of the person who created the obstruction to remove it, though it may recover of such person the damages
to which it is subjected. So, where a railroad company is charged
with the duty of repairs, it has been held that the town may still
be bound. In Currierv. Lowell, 16 Pick. 170, a railroad company,
when crossing a highway with its road, was required so to construct.
its road as not to obstruct the safe and convenient use of the highway. Tile statute also provided that the company might raise or
lower the highway; and that, if the highway should not be so
raised or lowered as to be satisfactory to the selectmen of the town,
the selectmen might require the company, in writing, to make the
alterations, and that if the company neglected to comply, the selectmen might make the alterations and recover indemnity from the
company. The plaintiff in passing on a highway was thrown into
an excavation made in the highway by the company. The town
was held not to have been relieved of its liability. So in Willard
v. -Newbury,22 Vt. 458, it was held in a similar case that the town
was not absolved from liability. And see Batty v. Duxbury, 24
Vt. 155.
In V7inal v. Dorchester, 7 Gray 421, the case of Currier v.
Lowell is said to carry the liability of towns to its extreme limit.
In later cases in Massachusetts it has been held that the town is
relieved when an individual or corporation is charged with the
duty of maintenance and repair: Sawyer v. -Northfield,7 Cush.
490; Davis v. Leominster, 1 Allen 182; White v. Quincy, 97
Mass. 430. This exemption, however, is placed upon the ground
that by the present statute of that state the liability is not absolute, but qualified, and does not arise where other sufficient provision for repair is made. In this state the liability is not subject
to any such qualification.
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In Lowell v. .Proprietorsof Locks & Canals, 104 Mass. 18,
and Proprietorsof Locks J- Canals v. Lowell Horse Railroad Corporation, 109 Mass. 221, the Supreme Judicial Court of lassachusetts had occasion to pass upon a statute similar to the statute
under which the defendant claims exemption. The court was of
the opinion that the city was not relieved by the statute. " It
authorizes," says the court,." for the public benefit the use of the
highway for a peculiar mode of travel on certain conditions. The
city may enforce the performance of the conditions ; but all the
provisions of the statute imply that the city is primarily liable for
want of repair :" 104 Mass. 28.
In City of Philadelphiav. Weller, 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. 400, an
action was brought against the city of Philadelphia for an injury
resulting in death, occasioned by a hole betweeen the tracks of the
Richmond and Schuylkill Passenger Railway Company on Girard
avenue. The company was chartered subject to the city ordinances, one of which provided that all railroad companies should
be at the expense of maintaining and repairing any street occupied by them. It was claimed on the part of the city that the
railroad compan' was primarily and exclusively liable for the
accident. But the court held that city and company were both
liable, and that, whichever was sued, the action could be maintained.
We think, in view of these authorities and of the implication
contained in the provision cited, we cannot decide that the city of
Providence, in so far as any portion of its streets is in the occupation of the Union Railroad Company, is, to that extent, discharged
of its liability to keep them safe and convenient for the public
travel. The second exception is therefore overruled.
The petition for a new trial alleges other exceptions. We are,
however, of the opinion that the exceptions alleged cannot be sustained. They rest upon the claim that certain ordinances, under
which the street was occupied by the railroad company with their
rails, constitute a contract with the company, and that, by virtue
thereof, the city has no power to remove any nuisance or obstruction in that portion of the street which is occupied by the railroad
track without previous notice to the company to remove the same,
and a neglect on their part for ten days to comply with the notice.
We deem it unnecessary to decide whether the ordinances do or do
not constitute such a contract, for if they do, the contract is, in cur
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opinion, utterly void. The duty, resting hpon a towri or city, to
keep its highways safe and convenient is a public duty. A city
or town has no power, unless authorized by statute, to divest itself
of its capacity to discharge the duty, either by contract or ordinance. We find no statutory authority for such a contract or
ordinance in the ease at bar. The exceptions are overruled.
Another ground atsigned for a new trial is, that the verdict is
against the evidence and the weight thereof. It is claimed that
there was no neglect on the part of the city, the defect in the
street being indicated by a light suspended over or beside it. There
was a conflict in the testimony upon the point whether there was
such a light. The testimony to prove that there was a light was
certainly very strong; but, even if conclusive, the jury may have
thought that it was not properly placed, or that, in the particular
circumstances, a single light, unless of more conspicuous size and
brilliancy, was an insufficient safeguard. The question was peculiarly a question for the jury; and the court, even though they
may not agree with the jury, ought not to disturb their verdict
without very weighty reasons. In the case at bar we allow the
verdict to etrd.
A new trial is refused.

Court of Comrmiiovers of Alabama
BUCK

AND

SPOFFORD

ET AL., CLAIMANTS, V.

Claime.

THE UNITED STATES.

Where a vessel has sailed under a charter-party with cargo aboard, she is entitled
to net freight for the whole voyage, in accordance with the terms of the charter,
though destroyed by an insurgent cruiser, when but one day out.
Where destroyed while sailing in ballast, under charter, to take in cargo at her
port of first destination, to be carried thence to a port of final destination, she ii
entitled to net freight on the cargo which she was thus to have taker, on board.
Where destroyed while sailing under one charter to deliver, at a designated port,
cargo on board, and to bring other cargo home, she is entitled to net freight for
the round trip.
Where destroyed while sailing under two distinct and independent charters, to
carry under the first, cargo to an intermediate port, and under the second, to carry
other cargo to a port more distant, she is entitled to net freight under each charter.
though destroyed before the fulfilment of the first, if she has made it satisfactorily
to appear by proper proof, or necessary legal presumption, that she entered fairly
at the same time on the commencement and prosecution of both voyages.
The provisions of the Act of Congress of June 23d 1874, that this court shall
not allow any claim for unearned or prospectivo frcights or profits, do not change
the foregoing principles of commercial law.
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THIs was a claim arising out of the destruction of the ships
Highlander and Jabez Snow. The facts are sufficiently stated in
the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
PORTER, J.-In the case of the ship "Winged Racer," we were
called to consider, among other subjects, a claim for the loss of
freight. After a protracted argument by eminent counsel, we
reached in that case conclusions which were, and are, satisfactory
to the minds of a majority of the court. In the cases above mentioned, some new phases of the question, growing out of a different
state of facts, were presented. This led the counsel of the government to insist on re-arguing the original questions decided in
the "Winged Racer:" s.nd, specially desiring to be right on a
point involving so large a part of the money paid by Great Britain,
we accorded this privilege, both to them and to the counsel of
various claimants. I am now to state the views entertained by
the court, after listening to these elaborate and learned arguments,
and then to apply the principles we have adopted, to the solution
of the questions presented in the cases of the "Highlander" and
the "Jabez Snow."
The government of the United States presented at Geneva a
large claim for the loss of freights. The British experts launched
pointed and severe criticisms at the claim made for gross freights,
but they could not deny the soundness of the claim for net freights,
if the conduct of Great Britain had rendered her liable for the
acts complained of by the United States. In the award made in
our favor, this principle was set forth as one of the conclusions of
the tribunal, that, "in order to arrive at an equitable compensation for the damages which have been sustained, it is necessary to
set aside all double claims for the same losses and all claims for
gross freights, so far as they exceed net freights."
When the Act of 23d June 1874 was framed, Congress, folloyving out this principle, gave to this court the following direction
(sect. 12): " And in no case shall any claim be admitted or allowed
for, or in respect to, unearned freights, gross freights, prospective
profits, freights, gains or advantages." The term "prospective,"
it will be observed, is predicated here, not only of profits, to which
it stands in juxtaposition, but also of freights, gains or advantages.
We are not to allow a claim for unearned freights, gross freights
or prospective freights; thus, by excluding all other kinds of
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freight, permitting, and, indeed, requiring us to allow claims for
net freight. That is, from the freight which a vessel, when destroyed, was engaged in earning, must be deducted the expenses
which she would thereafter have incurred if the voyage had been
successfully accomplished. By the immediately preceding section
of the act, we are required to decide upon the amount and validity
of such claims, not only in conformity to the provisions of the
statute, but according to the principles of law. We are to exclude
profits, freights and gains which were prospective, and freights
which were unearned, and we are to do this, not in some arbitrary
way dictated by our own sense of justice,. but according to the
principles of jurisprudence as established by courts of law and
adopted by the maritime nations of the world. We know, and we
have known from the beginning, the importance of reaching a
sound conclusion on the question thus arising both out of the
treaty and the statute. During the argument, we have been
properly reminded of the influence which our decision may hereafter exercise on the public interests. It is said that the United
States expects to carry out in the future, as she has in the past, thedoctrine of neutrality. It is reasonable that the principles adopted
in the distribution of the money awarded at Geneva should be.
applied toher, if she should ever be held responsible for violating
those important rules established by the 6th article of the treaty,
defining the duties of a neutral government in preventing the fitting out, within its jurisdiction, of vessels intended to carry on war
against a power with which it is at peace.
What, then, is "prospective freight," as employed in the award.
and in the statute? A plain illustration may supply the answer.
The owner of a ship at Philadelphia, finding her out ;f employment, concluded that if he were at the Chincha Islands, he would
be sure of a profitable cargo to Liverpool or New York. He proceeds, without any contract, iritten or verbal, equips his ship
sets sail, is captured by the Alabama, and sees his own ship sent
to the bottom. He files his claim in this court, shows the loss of
the vessel, proves her tonnage and the customary freight, and offers
the testimony of shippers in Callao, who state that if she had arrived there, they would have supplied a cargo equal to the carrying capacity of the ship. He exhibits his calculation, showing the
necessary deductions from the gross freight and asks the payment
of his claim. We decline to allow it, and tell him this was what
VOL. XXIV.-37
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the award meant when it declared that " prospective earnings cannot properly be made the subject of compensation ;" and this is
what the Act of Congress meant when it provided that a claim
should not be allowed for or in respect to "prospective profits,
freights, gains or advantages." Having thus found a distinct subject-matter to which this portion of the statute is applicable, we
ought, by well-settled rules of interpretation, to rest content that
we have ascertained the kind of profits which Congress meant to
define by the term "prospective."
What are "unearned freights" as employed in the act? What
do these terms, so unusual in the language of judges, shippers, carriers and underwriters, require us to exclude? By forbidding the
allowance of unearned freights, it was certainly not intended to
allow only freights fully earned. Freight is fully earned in the
judicial, as well as popular sense, when the vessel has reached her
port of destination and the cargo has been delivered-a place in
which she would not be in much danger of destruction at the hands
of an insurgent cruiser. If so destroyed, the question of freight
could not have arisen at all, for her charterers would then have
been her debtors, and the value of the vessel only would have been
lost to her owners. It is impossible to suppose that Congress could
have put so frivolous a thing into a serious statute. It is just as
clear that freights wholly unearned couldi not have beei intended,
that is, where no expenses had been incurred, no stores supplied,
no cargo taken on board, nothing done by shipper or owner towards the commencement of a voyage. Here, again, the vessel
would have been found in her dock and out of the reach of the
losses of which the statute treats. Even if she were not, her case
is effectually provided for by forbidding any allowance for prospective freights. The provision respecting "unearned freights"
was evidently intended to embrace something different from that
of the inhibition of prospective gains, and to have some practical
effect on the distribution of the money in hand. Let it be observed, then, that between these extremes-of freight wholly earned
and freight wholly unearned-there is an ample territory in which
judicial investigation has gone on from the dawn of commerce to
the present hour, and the results are found along the whole track
of the commercial law. A ship is made ready for sea, a charterparty more or less formal is executed, her cargo is shipped and
she starts on her voyage. She has not then earned her freight,
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and on the shipper or charterer she has no legal claim until after
the lapse of many months and the endurance of many perils. But
her owner has spent time and labor in fitting her out, has supplied
the necessary stores, advanced the wages of the crew, and subjected her to the largest risk to which property is ever subjected,
or paid to others the required compensation for assuming such
risk.. Can it be maintained that her freight is unearned, in the
large and general sense in which this term is used in the statuteunearned, without qualification-wholly unearned? Can it be.
denied that some part of it has been earned? Not as against the
shipper, if he has done nothing to change the contract, but even
as against him, if he has interrupted the voyage, and certainly as
against every one who wilfully or carelessly stops her progress.
Here the decisions, European and American, have an uniformityscarcely to be met with in any other department of the law.
The ship Cambodia sailed under charter from Bombay in ballast
for Howland's Island, intending to call at a port in New Zealand
for water, and having got on shore on the coast of New Zealand,
was so damaged that she was obliged to abandon her voyage.
Lord C. J. COCKBURN (afterwards one of the arbitrators at Geneva)
held, that as the ship had sailed with the sole object of going to
Iowland's Island, to earn freight thence to the United Kingdom,
the interest in the freight had commenced, although not a pound
of the cargo was on board when she struck: Barber v. Fleming,
Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 59. True, this was an action on a contract of
marine insurance, created by parties who could make their own
terms, and we ought to look for precedents arising outside of the
law of contracts altogether. Take, then, the case of a general
average arising from the jettison of goods for the common safety
of ship and cargo. Here Mr. Lowndes, citing Williams v. The
London Assurance Company, 1 M & S. 318, states the rule in
these terms: "When a ship is chartered to fetch or carry a cargo
belonging to the charterer, the freight under the charter must contribute to the general average, whether or not the cargo is on board
the ship at the time of the general average act ; since the loss of
the chartered ship, whether laden or not, would deprive the shipowner of his expected freight :" Lowndes on General Average
236. In the case of The Brig MTrary, Judge SPRAGUE carried out
the doctrine, by holding that where, by a charter-party, a gross
sum, not divisible, was to be paid as freight for a voyage out and
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home, the principal object of the voyage being to obtain a return
cargo, and a general average occurred on the outward passage
when the ship was sailing in ballast, the whole freight for the
round voyage must contribute: Sprague's Decisions 17. Turning
to cases of salvage, we find the same rule to prevail: The Nathaniel Hooper, 3 Sumner 542. It is true that Mr. Benecke
differs from Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, in the view taken by the latter
in the case of The Progresg, Edwards 210, that where a ship goes
out under a charter, to proceed to her point of destination, in ballast, and to receive her freight only upon her return cargo, the
court is not in the habit of dividing the salvage (in which he is
sustained by the case of The Dorothy Poster,6 C. Rob. 88), but it is
sufficient to observe respecting this difference of opinion, that no
man of his age was of higher authority on maritime law than the
judge who pronounced the judgment in that case. In the cases
of collision of vessels the same doctrine prevails. Even the case
of The South Sea v. The Clara Symes, Swabey's Rep. 141, is
really in harmony with the other cases, for although the claim for
freight was there rejected, and the owner of the injured vessel
was directed to pay the costs attending the claim which he had
made for freight, yet this was because of the doubt that arose from
the character of the vessel, whether the master could have carried
out the charter-party, even had the collision not occurred. The
decision of Dr. LUSHINGTON in The Gazelle, 2 W. Rob. 279, and
in The Argo, 1 Spink 375; the report of the registrar and
merchants in The Canada, 1 Lushington 586, made under Dr.
LUSHINGTON'S own eye; the decision of Dr. PHILLIMORE in The
Orpheus, Law Rep. 3 Adm. 308, where the cargo was not on board
at the time of the collision ; the opinions of several of our eminent admiralty judges in America: Bark Heroine, 1 Benedict
226 ; Egbert v. The B. J' 0. Railroad Co., 2 Benedict 225, and
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 101; The Cayuga, 14 Wall. 270;
The Favorita,18 Id. 598; have placed on a foundation too solid
to be shaken, the doctrine that the owner of a ship injured by a
collision, if not in fault, is entitled to recover her net freight from
the owner of the offending ship, if the performance of the charterparty be prevented by the collision.
Undoubtedly the closest analogies to the cases in hand are found
in those of the capture of vessels as prize of war. It is true that
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Great Britain did not admit her liability as a wrongdoer for the
acts of the insurgent cruisers, and, indeed, by the first article of
the treaty disclaimed it, but having negligently permitted the
equipment in her own ports, of vessels which could have had no
other object than thc destruction of our ships, she was placed by
the award in the legal attitude of having wrongfully captured
them. There are in the books few cases of the destruction of
vessels taken as prize of war, for the reason chiefly that they are
too valuable to the captor to be destroyed. One of the few is the
case of Der MAtohr, 4 0. Rob. 815, which was lost by the negligence of the prize-master, an officer of the British navy, while
being taken into port, and the captors were held liable both for
the ship and the freight, but relieved from liability by Act of Parliament. In The Copenhagen, 1 C. Rob. 289, seized in a British
port which she had entered in distress to make repairs, Sir WILLIAM
SCOTT, in treating of the question whether freight was due from
the owner of the cargo to the owners of the ship for the w.hole
voyage or only pro rata itineris, thus speaks: " With respect to
the freight some is admitted to be due, as the ship has brought her
cargo from Smyrna through much the most considerable part of
the voyage. But it is said that in matters of prize the whole
freight is always given, and for this reason, because capture is considered as delivery, and a captured vessel earns her whole freight.
I have already said that this is not merely or originally a matter
of prize; the ship was not brought in as such; she came in first
from distress and was afterwards put upon the proof of her character. It is a case of a mixed nature, and the maxim that capture
is delivery is not to be taken in the general way in which it is laid
down. It is by no means true, except when the captor succeeds
fully to the rights of the enemy, and represents him as to those
rights. If a neutral vessel, having enemy's goods, is taken, the
captor pays the whole freight, because he represents the enemy by
possessing himself of the enemy's goods jure belli; and although
the whole freight has not been earned by the completibn of the
voyage, yet as the captor, by his act of seizure, has prevented its
completion, his seizure shall operate to the same effect as an actual
delivery of the goods to the consignee, and shall subject him to
the payment of the full freight." The case of The Martha, 8 C.
Rob. 106; The Hamilton, 3 0. Rob. 107, and The Anna Catharine, 6 C. Rob. 10, recognise the same doctrine. In the argument
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before us, it was assumed that in no case of capture had freight
been allowed where the cargo was not on board at the time of the
capture; but The Pro.grcss, Edward's Adm. Rep. 210, seems to
present such a case. That vessel having sailed from England to
Oporto, in ballast, under a charter-party for an entire voyage out
and home, and having performed the outward voyage, was captured
by the French in that .port, and recaptured by the British and
Portuguese army under Wellington, before she had commenced her
homeward voyage. After the capture she had been unladen; on
the recapture, her cargo was in warehouse on shore Salvage was
allowed on the whole freight out and home. By the decision in
The Catlharina Elizabeth, 1 Acton Adm. Rep. 809, freight was
allowed to a neutral vessel, which had not actually sailed, though
her cargo was on board. It must be admitted that the American
decisions have not yet satisfactorily established here the English
rule, and some of them are adverse to it: The Armable -Arancy,
3 Wheat. 546; The Anna ifaria, 2 Wheat. 327; The Charming
Betsy, 2 Cranch 64. The Societe, 9 Cranch 209, was the case of
a neutral vessel sailing under charter-party to Amelia Island with
cargo freight free, where she was to take on board such cargo as
might be tendered to her, and while thus carrying British goods
was captured by a naval vessel of the United States, then at war
with Great Britain, and brought into the District of Georgia,
where the cargo was condemned as enemy's property. Chief Justice MARSHALL certainly held the two voyages to be distinct, probably much influenced by the division made of the freight which,
as to one voyage, was to be free, but payable as to the other. In
the comparatively recent case of The N e8tra Senora de Regla, 17
Wall. 30, a Spanish steamer seized in 1861 as prize of war, at Port
Royal, in which a huge sum was allowed to the owner for the
use of the vessel, there is some recognition of the English rule,
which must seem to every one who carefully examines the subject,
much more consonant to the whole system of the law of marine
torts.
It certainly follows from this discussion that in the cases before
us, the allowance of freight pro rata itineris peracti, so strongly
insisted on by the counsel for the government, is out of the question.
1. There is nothing in the Act of Congress to justify it. We
are not required to decide a case where the freight was wholly
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earned, or one in which it was wholly unbarned, for neither the
one case nor the other, as we have seen, could have arisen out of
the depredations of the insurgent cruisers. Such acts came too
soon for the one and too late for the other. We are called upon
to decide cases occupying ground intermediate between these extremes. The statute, therefore, wisely said nothing about apportioning the freight.
2. We could not undertake to determine upon and allow freight
pro rataitiferis where it had been partly earned and partly unearned, without violating those principles of law which Congress
specially cautioned us to observe. Left thus untrammelled by the
statute in respect to the measure of freight due, we had either to
take ground in opposition to what the most enlightened publicists
have written on this subject, and the most distinguished jurists
have approved, or to adopt principles which have thus acquired
the sanction of the jurisprudence of the maritime world. It required little sagacity and less courage to do the latter.
3. If we had undertaken to split the freight into fractions, and
to parcel it out, we should have failed in everything except doing
injustice. A practical eye will readily see this. Suppose the
ordinary voyage of a sailing vessel to be thirty days. In ten days
from the time of commencing to put cargo on board, she has completed, it may be, four-fifths of her entire earnings. Why? The
costs of loading and payment of wages to officers and men, the
supply of stores, and the other smaller and incidental but inevitable expenses, are the bulk of the cost of earning the entire freight.
All she then requires is those propitious influences of the elements
for which she is dependent, not on the power of man, but on the
favor of Heaven. Divide the whole freight thus begun to be
earned, according to the number of days out, or by any other rule,
and not in one case out of a thousand would justice be done. Deduct that which one of these vessels, if not destroyed, must have
expended between the point of her actual destruction and the port
of destination (generally only the expenses of maintaining the
crew, paying the port charges and delivering the cargo), and you
leave her owner just where every innocent man, whose person or
property is attacked in violation of law, ought by'the law to be
left; that is, as nearly sound and whole as if he had not been
struck.
What, then, is the practical result of these doctrines in the cases
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before us? Where a vessel has sailed under a charter-party with
cargo on board she is entitled to net freight for the whole voyage
in accordance with the terms of the charter, though destroyed when
but one day out. Where she was destroyed while sailing in ballast under charter to take in cargo at her port of first destination,
to be carried thence to a port of final destination, she is entitled
to net freight on the cargo which she was thus to have taken on
board. Where destroyed while sailing under one charter to deliver, at a designated port, cargo on board, and to bring other
cargo home, she is entitled, to net freight for the round trip.
Where destroyed while sailing under two distinct and independent
charters to carry, under the first, cargo to an intermediate port,
and under the second, to carry other cargo to a port more distant, she is entitled to net freight under each charter, though
destroyed before the fulfilment of the first, if she has made it
satisfactorily to appear by proper proof or necessary legal presumption, that she entered fairly at the same time on the commencement and prosecution of both voyages.
On these principles we decided, in June last, the case of The
Sonora. She sailed from New York to Melbourne, and she was
thence to sail to Akyab, in British India, to take on a cargo of
rice and proceed to one of several designated European ports.
The charter permitted an intermediate voyage in the China seas.
Having made such an intermediate voyage to Hong Kong, she
left that port for Akyab, and was destroyed by the Alabama in
the straits of Malacca. In the judgment entered in favor of her
owners, we allowed net freight for the cargo not on board at the
time of her destruction. So, also, in the case The Emma Jane,
decided during the same month. The case of The Commonwealth,
argued during the present month, affords an illustration of the
application of the same principle. She sailed from New York for
San Francisco with a large freight-list, and when about twentyeight days out was destroyed by the Florida. After she had
sailed, and before receiving information of her destruction, her
owners executed a charter, binding her to proceed from San Francisco to the Chincha Islands to take on guano deliverable at Hamburg. She had not sailed under the charter for the Chincha
Islands. She had done nothing whatever under it. Her officers
did not even hear of it until after her destruction. As to that
charter, her gains were prospective, which the award declares

VIRGINIA & TENNESSEE RAILROAD CO. v. SAYERS.

297

cannot properly be made the subject of compensation, inasmuch
as they depend in their nature upon future and uncertain contingencies." We accordingly disallowed to her freight under that charter, but admitted her right to net freight on the voyage to San
Francisco. We could not have done otherwise.
In the cases of the -"IHighlander" and the "Jabez Snow," now
before us, we have as little difficulty in allowing the freight. The
"'Highlander" was to proceed under charter to Akyab, Rangoon
or Bassein (with the privilege of an intermediate voyage to a
port in India or China), to take on, at one of those ports, rice
deliverable at Cork or Falmouth. She had performed the inter'mediate voyage, and was proceeding in ballast to Akyab for cargo
when she was destroyed by the Alabama. The "Jabez Snow"
carried with her two charters, under one of which she sailed from
Cardiff with coal for Montevideo, and by the other she was to proceed thence to Callao to take on guano deliverable at Havre. She
was destroyed by the Alabama, with the coal on board, before
reaching Montevideo. So far as we can judge, after a careful
scrutiny of all the testimony before us, each of these vessels, at
the time of her destruction, was proceeding in good faith in the
actual execution of the contracts which she had thus lawfully
assumed. We know of nothing more which either of them could
have done in the prosecution of the respective voyages thus commenced and suddenly terminated by the act of the most successful
of the insurgent cruisers. We accordingly allow to each of them
net freight on the cargo which she was thus proceeding to take on
board when destroyed. While we do not agree with the claimants
respecting the amounts which they are entitled to claim, these'are
the principles of law on which we have reached the conclusions
embodied in the judgments about to be entered.
C

Court of Appeals of Virginia.
VIRGINIA & TENNESSEE RAILROAD CO. v. SAYtERS.
It is well settled that common carriers may, by contract or by notice, restrict
their common-law liabilities as insurers against purely accidental loss or injury.
But they cannot, even by express contract, avoid liability for negligence, nor
limit it to gross negligence.
In an action against a railroad company for loss by negligence, the declarations
of a brakeman or a section-mnster not near enough to the time and place of the
accident to be parts of the res gestte, are not evidence. The rule as to declarations
of auents is thni same for corporations as for individuals.
VOL. XXIV.--38
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ERROR to Circuit Court. of Wythe county.

This was an action by defendant in error for damages for the destruction of cattle delivered by him to the railroad company for transportation. The material part of the contract contained in the bill of lading
was as follows:"That, whereas the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and connecting
lines transport live stock only at first class rates, except when, on consideration of a reduced rate by the car load, the owner and shipper
assumes certain risks specified below. Now on consideration of the said
railroad agreeing to transport the above-described live stock at the reduced rate of thirty-six dollars and eighty cents per car load, and a free
passage to the owner or his agent on the train ! with the stock, the said
owner and shipper do hereby assume and release the said railroad from
all injury, loss and damage or depreciation which the animals or either
of them may suffer in consequence of either of them being weak, or
escaping, or injuring themselves or each other, or in consequence of
overloading, heat, suffocation, fright, viciousness, or of being injured by
fire, or the burning 6f any material, while in the possession of the company; and from all other damage incidental to railroad or steamboat
transportation, which shall not be established to have been caursed by the
gross neqligence or delinquency of any of the officers or agents of the said
railroador steamboat companies."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHRISTIAN, J.-The instructions offered by both plaintiff and defendant, those refused and those given, raise the question whether a railroad
company can limit its liability as a common carrier, by express contract,
so as to excuse itself for negligence, unless such negligence amounts to
gross negligence; in other words, whether it can by contract excuse itself from negligence at all. The court below held that it could not,
that if the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the company or its
agents, no contract they could make with the shipper or consignee, however plainly expressed, could release the company. It is this judgment
of the Circuit Court, thus expounding the law, we are first called upon
to review.
This question is one of first impression in this state. 'While it has
been the subject of much judicial discussion in England and many of
the states of this Union, where the decisions have been to some extent
conflicting, the precise question has never been decided by this court.
We have, therefore, given to the subject a careful and candid investigation.
Railroad companies are invested with the powers and subject to the
liabilities of common carriers. At common law persons and corporations
exercising such public employment, are, upon grounds of public policy,
held to a stringent liability, which. is not exacted of ordinary bailees.
At common law, they are insurers, to a certain extent, of the goods intrusted to them, and are held responsible for tll injuries thereto,, except
those caused by the act of God or the public enemies. The law which
fixed these rights and obligations is of ancient origin and founded upon
grounds of public policy. The exclusive possession of the property in
the carrier, the ordinarily exclusive possession by him of the means of
evidence, the facility of embezzlement, and of collusions with thieves

VIRGINIA & TEINESSEE RAILROAD CO. v. SAYERS.

299

and robbers, and the entire separation of the owner from his property
during the transit, are some of the leading grounds of public policy
which gave rise to this extraordinary responsibility.
These rigorous rules of the common law have been modified sometimes by legislation and more frequently by decisions of the courts, to
the extent that the carrier may by express contract limit his liability as
an insurer. Thus, by an Act of Congress passed in 1851 in relation to
sea-going vessels, ship-owners are relieved from all responsibility for
loss by fire unless caused by their own design or neglect; and from
responsibility for loss of money and other valuables named, unless notified of their character and value. And there is similar legislation in some
of the states, as I am informed, but. to whose statutes I have not access
here. But the common law rules have been relaxed in most of the
states by the decision of the courts, to the extent of granting by express contract, or notice brought home to the shipper, a limitation of
their liabilities as insurers. Even the policy of such limitation has
been doubted by learned judges and eminent writers on this subject.
" As the duties and responsibilities of public carriers are prescribed by
public policy, it has been seriously doubted," says Mr. Justice BRADLEY (17 Wall. 359), " whether the courts did wisely in allowing that
policy to be departed from without legislative interference by which
needed modifications could have been introduced into the law."
Itwould be an instructive and interesting investigation to trace the
causes which led to the relaxation of the rigorous rules of the common
law, and to note how strenuously the courts for a long time resisted all
attempts of -common carriers to limit their common-law liabilities. It
is easy to perceive that the modification of the common law grew out of
the great hardship incurred by the carrier in certain special cases; for
instance, cases where goods of great value, or subject to extra risk, were
delivered to him without notice of their character, or where losses happened by sheer accident, without any possibility of fraud or collusion on
his part, such as accidental fire, collision at sea, &c. Such cases as
these led to a relaxation of the rule to the extent of authorizing certain
exemption from liability in such cases, to be secured either by public
notice brought home to the owner of the goods, or by inserting exemptions from liability in the bill of lading or other contract of carriage.
That a common carrier may limit his common-law liability to the extent above indicated may now be considered as well settled.
But the important question is how far can he go beyond that ? Can
he secure by contract an exemption from liability for acts arising out of
his own negligence or that of his agents ? Can he by contract limit
his responsibility only to a case of gross negligence, as is attempted in
this caic?
In this state, as before observed, these questions have never been the
subject of judicial investigation. We must, therefore, look for authority
to the works of eminent authors, which are the recognised text-books of
the law on this subject, and to the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States and of our sister states, as well as the decisions of the
English courts, and from these sources of high authority settle the law
upon this important question for this state.
Mr. Justice SToRY, in his work on Bailments, § 571, says "But -n,
inquiry may be made whether the carrier will not be liable also fbr ordi-
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nary negligence as well as for gross negligence, 'notwithstanding such

notices (i. e., such notices as are brought home to the party, and thereby constituting an express contract). There are dicta by various judges,
indicating that the common rule of ordinary diligence, in common cases
of hire, is applicable to the case of carriers under notice. On the other
hand, there are declarations of judges at nisi prius, as well as their
opinions in bane, which seem to put it as a question of gross negligence
or not. The question may now be considere d at rest, by an adjudication
entirely satisfactory in its reasoning, and turping upon the very point,
in which it was held that in case of such notices the carrier is liable for
losses and injuries occasioned not only by gross negligence, but by ordinary negligence; or, in other words, the carrier is bound to ordinary
diligence." The author, to sustain this view, refers to Wild v. Pickford,
8 M. & W. 461. Referring to that case, I find that Mr. Baron PARKE
uses the following language: "Upon reviewing the cases on this subject the decisions and dicta will not be found altogether uniform, and
some uncertainty still remains as to the trueiground in which cases are
taken out of the operation of these notices." After reference to a
number of cases he says: "The weight of authority, however, seems
to be in favor of the doctrine, that in order! to render a carrier liable
after such notice, it is not necessary to prove a total abandonment of
that character, or an act of wilful misconduct, but that it is enough to
prove an act of ordinary negligence, which is gross negligence in the
sense in which it has been understood in the last-mentioned casts."
Judge REDFIELD, in his valuable work on Carriers and other Bailees,
§ 156, says: There is certainly something very iucongruous and not
a little revolting to the moral sense, that a bailee for hire should be
allowed to stipulate for exemption from the consequence of his own
negligence, ordinary or extraordinary. A laborer, domestic or mechanic,
who should propose such a stipulation, would be regarded as altogether
unworthy of confidence in any respect, and the employer who should
submit to such a condition must be reduced to extreme necessity, one
would suppose." After an interesting review of the cases on the subject, and after quoting the general rule of law upon this point as stated
by Baron PARKE, in Wild v. Pckford, sipra,the learned author remarks, § 163: "This seems to be placing the effect of such notices upon
a reasonable basis, and most of the American cases will be found to have
adopted in the main similar views."
With this reference to, and extracts from, the works of STORY and
REDFIELD, I come now to consider the case decided by the Supreme
Court of the United State and of the other states.
The question we are now considering has been more than once determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. The first case to
be noticed is the case of The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company
v. Merchants' Bank, reported in 6 Howard 344, and decided in 1848.
The case was this, and grew out of the burnIiug of the steamer Lexington. Certain money belonging to the bank had been intrusted to Harden's Express to be carried to Boston, and was on board the steamer
when she was destroyed. By agreement between the Steamboat Company and Harden, the crate of the latter and its contents were to be at
his sole risk. The court held this agreement valid so far as to exonerate
the Steamboat Company from the responsibility imposed by law, but not
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to excuse them frQm misconduct or negligence. Mr. Justice NELSON,
delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Although he, the carrier,
was allowed to exempt himself from losses arising out of events and
accidents against which he was a sort of insurer, yet, inasmuch as lie
had undertaken to carry the goods from one place to another, he was
deemed to have incurred the sante degree of responsibility as that which
attaches to a private person engaged casually in the like occupation, and
was therefore bound to use ordinary care in the custody of the goods."
The next case which came before the Supreme Court of the' United
States was Philadelphia& Reading Railroad Company v. Derby. That
was the case of a free passenger-a stockholder of the company taken
over the road by the president to examine its condition-and it was
contended in argument that, as to him, nothing but ",gross negligence"
would make. the company liable. Mr. "ustice GRIEur, delivering the
opinion of the court, said: "1When carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and
safety requires that they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence, and whether the consideration for such transportation be pecuniary or otherwise, the personal safety of passengers should not be left to
the sport of chance or the negligence of careless agents. Any negligence in such cases may well deserve the epithet of' gross' :" 14 Howard 486. In a subsequent case this doctrine was reaffirmed "as resting
not only on public policy but on sound principles of law :" Steamboat
New World v. King, 16 Howard 469-494. In York bo. v. Central
Railroad,3 Wall. 113, the same court, after conceding that the responsibility imposed on the carrier of goods by the common law, may be
restricted and qualified by express stipulation, adds, "where such stipulation is made and it does not cover losses from negligence or misconduct, we can see no just reason for refusing its recognition and enforcement."
In the case of Express Company v. Ronnledge Brothers, the carriers
were sued for the value of gold dust delivered to them on a bill of lading, excluding liability for any loss or damage by fire, act of God,
enemies of the government,' or dangers incidental to a time of war. The
company was held liable for a robbery by a predatory band of armed
men (which was one of the excepted risks), because they negligently
and needlessly took a route which was exposed to such incursions. The
judge at the trial charged the jury that although the contract was
legally sufficient to restrict the liability of the defendants as common
carriers, yet if they were guilty of actual negligence they were responsible, and that they were chargeable with negligence unless they exercised the care and prudence of a prudent man in his own affairs. The
Supreme Court held this to be a correct statement of the law: 8 Wallace
342, 353.
The most recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States is the case of Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wallace 257.
This case would seem to be exactly in point. It was a case of injury to a
cattle drover travelling on a stock train upon a free pass, and when there
was an express contract that lie should take all risk of injury to the
stock, and of personal injury to himself The unanimous judgment of
the court in that case established the following propositions, as laid down
by Mr. Justice BRADLEY: 1. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipu-
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late for exemption from responsibility when such -exemption is not just
and reasonable in the eye of the law. 2. It is not just and reasonable
in the eye of the law to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for
til negligence of himsclf or his servants. 3. These rules apply both
to common carriers of goods and common carriers of passengers. 4. They
apply to a case of a drover travelling on a stock train to look after his
cattle, and having a free pass tbr that purpose.
1 have thus Tihr givenl the adjudications of the Supreme Court of the
United States upon the qt.estion under consideration, as well as the
opinions of authors of recognised authority, to show that a common
carrier cannot by express contract limit his common law liability to the
extent of exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself
or his servants.
I come now to notice the course of decisions in the different states of
the Union.
First, as to the decisions in the state of New York : Up to the year
1858, the course of decisions in that state had been in conformity with
the principles announced in the cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States above referred to. But in a case decided in 1858lWells v. N. Y Central Railroad Co., 26 Barb. 641-the Supreme Court
ot' that state seems to have given its assent for the first time to the -proposition that a common carrier may stipulate against responsibility for
the negligence of his servants ; and this, contrary to thedecisions before
that time. may now be taken as the settled, law of New York. See
opinion of Mr. Justice BRADLEY, 17 Wallace 369. But this conclusion
was reached against the earnest protest of some of the ablest judges of
that state. And Judge DAVIS, in SAvison v. N Y. Central Rmilro(d,
32 N. Y. 337, significantly remarks, in commenting on the recent decisions in that state: "The fruits of this rule are already being gatllered
in increasing accidents through the decreasing care and negligence on
the part of these corporations, and they will'be continued to be reaped
until a just sense of public policy shall lead to legislative restriction
upon the power to make this kind of contracts."
In Pennsylvania a long course of decisions settles the doctrine that a
common carrier cannot by notice or express contract limit his liability
so as to exonerate him from responsibility for his own negligence or that
of his servant.

In Farnham,v. Camden Railroud Co., 55 Penn. St. 62, Chief Justice Tno-NIPSON, delivering the opinion of the court., says, the doctrine is
firmly settled in this state that a common carrier cannot limit his liability
so as to cover his own or his servant's negligence. In Pennsylvania Raili'oad Co. v. Henderson, 51 Penu. 315, a drover's pass stipulated for immuuity of tile company in case of injury from negligence of its agents
or otherwise. Judge READ, after a careful review of the Pennsylvania
decisions, says : "This endorsement relea.es the company from all liability for any cause whatever, for any loss or injury to the person or property, however it may have been occasioned ; and our doctrine settled by
the above decisions made upon grave deliberation, declares that such a
release is no excuse for negligence. See also 8 Penn. 479; 16 Id. 67;
30 Id. 242 ; 63 Id. 14.
In Ohio the cases are very decided on this subject, and reject all
attempts of the carrier to stipulate against his own negligence or that
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of his servants. In'Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio State 131, the court,
after conceding the right of the carrier to make special contracts to a
certain extent, says: " He cannot, however, protect himself' from losses
occasioned by his own fault. He exercises a public employmnent, and diligence and good faith in the discharge of his duties are essential to his
public duties. * * * * * And public policy forbids that he should
be relieved by special agreement from that degree of diligence and fidelity that the law has exacted in the discharge of his duties. See also
Welsh v. Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & Clicago Railroad,10 Ohio 76; Jones
v. Vorhees, 10 Id. 145; 21 Id. 722; 19 Id. 1, 221, 260.
The decisions of the Supreme Courts of Maine and Massachusetts
are to the same effect, by one unbroken current. To the same purport
are the decisions of many of the other states, which time and space
only permit me to mention p)assim, but which are well worthy of attentive perusal and more particular notice. See 31 Ind. 394; 2 Rich.
(So. Car.)286 ; 28 Georgia 543; 37 Alabama 247; 39 3iss. 822 ; 20
Louisiana Ann. 302.
After this hasty review of the decisions of the American courts on
the question before us, I will now make brief reference to the English
cases.
Up to the year 1832 the course of the English decisions had been
uniformly against permitting a common carrier to contract for exemption of responsibility for loss or injury resulting from his own negligence
or that of his servants. And consequently, in Mr. Justico STOMY's work
on Bailments, published in 1832, he correctly gives the state of the English law as stated supra. But between that time and the passage of the
Railway and Canal Traffic Act, passed in 1854, there was a change of
opinion on the subject, and it was held in several cases that carriers
could stipulate fbr exemption from liability, even for their gross negligence. See Carr v. Lancashire Railroad Co., 7 Exch. 707 ; lelck v.
North Staffordshire Railway Col, 10 11oc Lords Cas. 473.
In the last named case, decided in 1862. Mr. Justice BLACKBURN,
after an able and interesting review of the course of decisions in England on this subject, and referring to 'Mr. Justice STORY'S work on Bailments, published in 1832, quoted in the opinion sipra, says: "In my
opinion the weight of authority was in 1832 iu favor of this view of the
law, but the cases decided in our courts between 1832 and 1854 established that this was not the law, and that a carrier might by a special
notice make a contract limiting his responsibility even in the cases here
mentioned of gross negligence, misconduct or fraud on the part of his
servants ; and, as it seems to me, the reason why the legislature intervened in the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854, was because it
thought that the companies took advantage of these decisions, in STORY's
language, "to evade altogether the salutary policy of the common law."
In the same case, Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN, referring to the case
of Carr v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railroad Co., sipra, in which it
was held that a common carrier might by express contract release himself from liability even for gross negligence, says: "In a very short time
after the decision of this case was pronounced, the Act of Parliament
was passed," known as the Railroad and Canal Act. "It cannot be
doubted that the object of the legislature, in passing it, was to prevent
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these contracts, in which any liability for negligence is either entirely
excluded or made conditional on the payment of a premium."
The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, passed in 18(64, adopted in consequence of these decisions, provides: "§ 7. Every such company shall be
liable for the loss of, or any injury done to any horses, cattle or other animals, or to any articles, goods or things in the receiving, forwarding or delivery thereof, occasioned by the neglect or default of such company or its
servants, notwithstanding any notice, condition or declaration made or
given by such company contrary thereto, or in any wise limiting such
liability, every such notice, condition or declaration being hereby deelared to be null and void."
It will thus be seen that by this Act of Parliament the salutary rule
of public policy, which prohibits a common carricr from limiting is
liability so as to exonerate him from the consequences of his own negli
gence, has been in effect reinstated in England, and the evils growing
out of the change in the course of decisions: and the departure from
those wise and salutary decisions which had prevailed in the English
courts fi,r more than half a century, had at last to be corrected by an
Act of' Parliament, restoring the older and better rule of law.
From this review of the American and English decisions I am constrained to conclude that the great weight of authority is in favor of
declaring that the salutary rule of law and public policy, which forbids
a common carrier from exempting himself! from liability by express
contract or otherwise for his own negligence, whether gross or ordinary,
should be firmly adhered to and maintained by the courts of this state.
But it is argued with much force by the learned counsel for the appellants that parties have a right to make their own contracts; that it is
no concern of the public on what terms an individual has his goods carried; that if lie chooses to accept all the risks by paying less for the
carriage, how does it concern the public, and what public policy does it
violate; how are public morals or public interests affected? Is it not a
restriction upon trade and commerce, and an invasion of personal rights,
for the courts to interfere and to declare such agreements, voluntarily
and .deliberately made, null and void ? Such arguments as these were
also urged in the case of Railroad Company v. Lockwood, supra, 878,
and were thus conclusively answered by 'ir Justice BRADLEY, and I
cannot do better than to adopt his answer: "Is it true," he says, "that
the public interests are not affected by individual contracts of the kind
referred to? Is not the whlle business conimunity affected by holding
such contracts valid ? If held valid, the advantageous position of the
companies exercising the business of common carriers is such that it
places it in their power to change the law of common 'carriers in effect
by introducing new rules of obligation. The carrier and his customer
do not stand on a footing of equality. The latter is only one individual
of a million. He cannot afford to higgle or stand out and seek redress
in one court. His business does not admit such a course. He prefers
rather to accept every bill of lading or to sign every paper the carrier
presents, often, indeed, without knowing what the one or the other contains. In most cases lie has no alternative but to do this or ab:ndon his
business." These cogent and just views of Mr. Justice BRADLEY are
as strongly illustrated by the case we have before us as the one he was
considering. In this case the railroad company required the drover to
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pay on his cattle as first-class freight unless he signed the contract. He
therefore would have had to pay the enormous sum or $6.60 per head
for each animal, or $113 per car load, instead of $:6. No drover could
afford to pay these rates; and this case is a strong illustration of how
completely parties are in the power of the railroad companies, and how
necessary it is to stand firmly by those principles of law by which the
public interests are protected. The inequality of the parties, the coipulsion under which the customer is placed, and the obligations of the
carrier to the public, operat2 with full fbree to divest such transaction
of validity. The business of the common carrier is mostly concentrated
in the hands of powerful corporations, whose position in the body politic
enables them to control it. They do in fact control it, and impose such
conditions upon travel and transportation as they see fit, which the public is compelled to accept. These circumstances furnish an additional
argument, if any were needed, to show that the conditions imposed by
common carriers ought not to be adverse (to say the least) to the dictates
of public policy and morality. Contracts of common carriers, like those
of fiduciaries, giving them a position in which they can take an undue
advantage of the persons with whom they contract, must rest upon their
fairness and reasonableness. It was for the reason that the limitations
of liability, first introduced by common carriers into these notices and
bills of lading, were just and reasonable, that the courts sustained them.
It was just and reasonable that they should not be responsible for
losses happening by sheer accident or the dangers of navigation, that no
human skill could guard against; it was just and reasonable that they
should not be 'chargeable for money or other valuable articles liable to be
stolen or damaged, unless apprized of their character or value; it was just
and reasonable that they should not be responsible for articles liable to
rapid decay, or for live animals liable to get unruly from fright, and to
injure themselves in that state, when such articles or animals became injured without their fault or negligence. And when any of these just
and reasonable excuses were incorporated into notices or special contracts
assented to by their customers, the law might well give effect to these
without the violation of any important principle, although modifying the
strict rules of responsibility imposed by the common law. The improved
state of society and the better administration of the hws had diminished the opportunities of collusion and bad faith on the part of thecarrier, and rendered less imperative the application of the iron rule
that he must be responsible at all events. Hence the exemptions referred to were deemed reasonable and proper to be allowed; but the
proposition to allow a public carrier to abandon altogether his obligations
to the public, and to stipulate for exemptions that are unreasonable and
improper, amounting to an abdication of the essential duties of his employment, ought never to be entertained.
I think, therefore, "that," to use the language of Chief Justice
REDFIELD, ': every attempt of carriers by general notices or special contract to excuse themselves from responsibility for losses or damage resuilting in any degree from their own want of care and faithfulness, is
against that good faith which the law requires as the basis of all contracts or employments, and therefore based upon principles and a policy
which the law will not uphold."
But the learned counsel for the appellee, in his able argument in
VOL. XXIV.-39
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behalf of the company, insisted that the law recogniscd different degrees
of negligence, and it was legitimate for a common carrier to limit his
liability to losses or damage from all causes except gross negligence, as
was done in this case by express contract. I think an examination of
the authorities will show that the distinctions between "gross" negligence and ordinary negligence are too vague and shadowy to be of any
practical importance in the adjudication of questions of this sort.
The tendency of judicial opinion is adverse to any distinction between
gross and ordinary negligence. In each case, the negligence, whatever
epithet we give it. is fiailure to bestow the care and skill which the situation demands, and hence it is more strictly accurate to call it, simply,
negligence." The decided preponderance of authority is in favor of
abolishing the vague and uncertain distinctions between the different
degrees of negligence, and to hold the public carrier bound whenever it
is shown that the loss orkdamage is occasioned by negligence at all,
whether gross or ordinary; or, in other words, the carrier is bound to
ordinary diligence. See 1 Smith Lead. Cas. (7th Am. ed.) 453; Story
on Bailhents, § 571 ; Wyld v. Peckjord, 8 M. & W. 460; 11 Id. 115;
2 Q. B. 661 ; 14 How. 486; 17 Wall. 383.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the Circuit Court of Wythe county
did not err in giving the instructions which it gave the jury, or in
refusing those which it refused to give, botl sets of instructions presenting, in different forms, the question we have been discussing, and the
said court having decided that the railroad company cannot by express
contract exonerate itself from liability for loss or damage occasioned by
the negligence (whether gross or ordinary) of its agents, servants or
employees.
There are now two other grounds of error assigned which remain to
be noticed. First, as to the demurrer to the declaration; second, as to
the admissibility of certain evidence offered by the plaintiff and admitted by the court.
As to the first, it is sufficient to remark, that a careful inspection of
the declaration shows that each count is a count in assumpsit, and no
one of them in tort; so that, in fact, there is no misjoinder of counts
as claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, and the Circuit Court
was right in overruling the demurrer.
The next ground of error assigned presents a more serious question,
and requires a more particular notice. It is raised by the 3d, 4th and
5th bills of exception taken by the defendants, and presents the question
whether the evidence therein set forth was competent to go to the jury.
It was proposed by the plaintiff to prove by the witness Parish that
he heard a negro brakesman, who was on the train with plaintiff's cattle,
say, "that, .had it not been for the brake on the East Tennessee ear, the
train would have run off with them coming down the Allegheny mountains." This remark of the brakesman was made before the accident,
and at Salem, a distance of forty-two miles from the scene of the disaster.
It was further proposed, on the part of the plaintiff, to prove, by the
witness Crockett, that he heard one Burroughs, who was a section-master on defendants' road embracing the point where the accident occurred,
say that "he (Burroughs) expected an accjdent on that part of the road
where said accident did take place"
This conversation took place
some time after the accident happened, and when Crockett and the plain-
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tiff were coming from Lynchburg, on a special train, back to the point
of the accident; the said section-master, Burroughs, being on said
special train with them.
The question is, whcther these dcclarations of the brakesman and section-master were competent to go to the jury. The court below admitted
the evidence. Was this error ? It is insisted that these declarations
were admissible, though hearsay, as tie declarationsof agents. It is
true that, where the acts of the agent will bind the principal, there his
declarations, representations. and admissions respecting the subject-matter will also bind him, if made at the same tine and constituting part of
the res geste. They are of the nature of original evidence, and not of
hearsay, the representation or statement in such cases beihg the ultitimate fact to be proved, and not an admission of some other fact. The
party's own admission, whenever made, may be given in evidence against
him; but the admission or declaration of his agent binds him onldy when
it is made during the continuance of his agency in regard to a transaction then depending et dunifcrvet opus. It is because it is a verbal act
and part of the res gestm that it is admissible at all. It is to be observed
that the rule admitting the declarations of the agent is founded upon the
legal identity of the agent and the principal, and the declaration of the
agent, to be admissible, must be part of the res gest.T: 1 Greenleaf,
Redfield's edition, sects. 113, 114; Story on Agency, sects. 134-137.
But it is argued, with some force, that these general rules do not apply to corporations which do their business entirely through agents, and
that companies engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers
are responsible for the declarations of their agents and employees,
through whose instrumentality their whole business is transacted. This
is a striking view of the subject, and some few cases, it is admitted, may
be found adopting this view. Bur Chief Justice REDFIELD, in his edition
of 1 Greenleaf, p. 135, sect. 114 (a) and notes, has collected the authorities, and says: "In general such companies are not responsible for
the declarations or admissions of any of their servants beyond the immediate sphere of their agency, and during the transaction of the business
in which they are employed. Thus the declarations of the conductor of
a railway train as to the mode in which an accident occurred, made after
its occurrence, or those of an engineer made under similar circumstances,
are nyt admissible." This is authority exactly in point. See, also,
Griffin v. ilfontgomery Railroad Co., 26 Geo. 111I Robinson v. Fitchburg Railroad Company, 7 Gray 92.
In L edy v. The Hudson River Railroad Company, 17 New York
Court of Appeals Reports 131, it was held, that the declaration of the
driver of -acar, after the car had stopped, assigning the reason why he
did not stop the car and thus prevent the injury to the plaintiff while
crossing the street, that he could not stop the car because the brakes
were out of order, being made after the injury was inflicted and the
transaction terminated, is not admissible against the company in whose
employ such driver was, it being mere hearsay. See, also, to this same
effect, Moore v. Mlleacham, 10 N. Y. 207; Lane v. B unt, 9 Gray 245.
I think, therefore, upon principle and authority, that the declarations
of the brakesman and section-master, made at the time and under the
circumstances when made, were not a part of the res gestmc, but mere
hearsay, and ought to have been excluded. There was no reason why

